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SUMMARY: The paper problematises the role of the European Union in territorial sovereignty 
conflicts. It points to the inherent characteristics of the Union constitutional structure that 
constrain the EU from becoming more active in the resolution of Territorial Sovereignty 
Conflicts within its borders. At the same time, it suggests that there is space for the EU to 
assume a much more constructive role. 
KEYWORDS: EU Law; Europeanisation; Territorial Sovereignty Conflicts; Conflict Resolution. 
 
I. Introduction 
The EU’s historical success as a peacemaker between France and Germany has inspired many 
to wonder whether the EU may also bring peace to other conflicts. It is true that historically 
speaking at least, the EU area itself has proved remarkably free of conflict. Having said that, 
the Union has not managed to play a significant role as an actor in the settlement of territorial 
sovereignty disputes that have taken place inside its borders, such as the ones in Northern 
Ireland, the Basque country or even Cyprus.1 Taking the cue from this somewhat paradoxical 
situation, the paper problematises the role of the European Union in territorial sovereignty 
conflicts. It argues that it is the limited legal toolbox that does not allow the EU to undertake 
a more active role in conflict resolution within its borders and has made her appear as a rather 
reluctant peacemaker. The paper develops its argument in three steps. In the following 
section, the paper provides for three reasons why the EU should consider assuming a more 
active role in territorial sovereignty conflicts. Section III points to the inherent characteristics 
of the Union constitutional structure that constrain the EU from assuming such role within its 
borders. The paper concludes with some thoughts about how the EU could assume a more 
constructive role and how the Code of Good Practice could contribute to that. 
 
II. Why should the EU intervene? 
The minimum (if any) involvement of the EU in disputes such as the ones in the Basque 
Country and Northern Ireland together with its failure to ‘catalyse’ a solution in the Cyprus 
issue, demonstrate that the toolbox of the Union is rather limited when dealing with conflicts 
within its borders and that the EU membership itself is far from a panacea as we will see in 
the next section. Having said that, there are at least three reasons why the EU should at least 
consider assuming a more active role in the resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes.  
Firstly, from a normative point of view, such role would very much be in conformity with its 
raison d'être as a peace plan. Rather than actively fighting to eradicate nationalism, the EU --
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since its inception-- has provided for a pragmatic legal, political and economic framework 
where competing nationalisms co-exist and even cooperate. It has designed political and legal 
institutions in which the competing nationalisms can continue to be negotiated.2 It is precisely 
the historical success of this pragmatic framework that transformed foes of the past such as 
France and Germany to reliable partners of today. Such success has inspired many to wonder 
whether the EU may also catalyse the settlement of other conflicts both within its territory 
and in its immediate neighbourhood.3 A more active engagement in territorial sovereignty 
disputes that pose a threat to the peaceful and democratic politics in the European continent 
would be very much in tune with EU’s existential scope to promote peace between its 
members. 
Secondly, within the European constitutional landscape, one has to take into account the 
multilevel aspect of the right of self-determination. This right and in particular its external and 
most controversial dimension ie. secession consists simultaneously of the ‘ultimate challenge 
to state sovereignty [and] the reinforcement of [its] virtues’4 by envisaging ‘the voluntary 
withdrawal of a political territory from a larger one in which it was previously incorporated.’5 
Within the EU, however, secession can be also seen ‘as a move to change the status or 
affiliation of a territory within a wider constellation of polities’.6 The Catalan independentists, 
for instance, have claimed that they want to create a ‘nou Estat d’ Europa’. Meanwhile, the 
Scottish National Party has long campaigned on the slogan ‘independence in Europe’. In fact, 
their post-Brexit strategy has been intrinsically linked with a second independence 
referendum that would subsequently lead to their re-accession to the EU. In both cases, the 
independendists do not favour a Robinsonian existence of the respective new States. Instead, 
they prioritise their ‘upgrade’ from mere subnational authorities7 to fully functional Member 
States within the EU legal order. Such ambition by itself raises a number of questions for the 
Union: Is there a pathway to membership for independent States coming out of such a 
process? What kind of conditions for accession are imposed on them? What are the 
responsibilities of the rump State? A more active role in such conflicts would allow the Union 
to effectively address those questions and become a stabilising factor within the unstable 
environment of those constitutional crises. 
Finally, the EU has declared conflict resolution as one of its key foreign priorities in its 
southern and eastern neighbourhoods, presenting it as an “essential aspect of the EU’s 
external action.”8 In ‘Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ it 
is underlined that “[t]he EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, 
concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south, while considering 
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engagement further afield on a case by case basis.”9 We do not find similar aims with regard 
to disputes that take place within its borders. This creates a discrepancy between its external 
and its internal actions. A more active role of the EU in territorial sovereignty disputes that 
take place within the territory of Member States would bring greater consistency between 
the EU actions both within and outwith its own borders. 
 
III. Problematising the role of the EU  
The previous section referred to three reasons why the EU should engage in a more active 
fashion in territorial sovereignty disputes. From a normative point of view, an apathetic role 
sits uncomfortably with the ethos of the EU as a peace plan. At the same time, from the 
standpoint of the EU as a constitutional order of States, it is important to effectively address 
the ambitions of those political entities that aim at becoming fully functional Member States. 
Finally, greater consistency is needed between the EU policies towards conflicts that take 
place within its boundaries and in the rest of the world.  
Having said that, we should problematise the role of the EU. The fact that a more active role 
in the resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes is in conformity with the aforementioned 
principles, does not mean that its current legal toolbox provides for the necessary space for 
the EU to assume such role. There are intrinsic characteristics of the Union constitutional 
structure that constrain the EU from becoming more active in intrastate conflicts within its 
borders. The Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’ refrain from allowing the EU to 
become active in an area that touches on the very core of their sovereignty. This becomes 
particularly evident if one examines closely whether the EU has a legal basis to act as an 
honest broker in such conflicts. Finally, the asymmetrical nature of the relationship that the 
EU enjoys with its Member States and their regions, poses a question as to whether it is even 
politically prudent for the EU to assume such role. 
 
A. Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’ 
Dashwood once famously proclaimed that the EU is a “constitutional order of States.”10 This 
means inter alia that the Member States as Herren der Verträge have to unanimously agree 
on the text of the EU Treaties in order to design the constitutional framework of the Union. 
They are the authors of the constitutional charter of the Union.11 Taking that into account, it 
is hardly surprising that the Member States do not want to impute any particular role to the 
EU with regard to issues that touch upon their national sovereignty, such as intrastate 
conflicts. Those conflicts often question the sovereignty of a metropolitan State over a given 
territory and thus the very essence of statehood. 
A mere look to the text of the EU Treaties verifies our conclusion. Apart from generic 
references to ‘[t]he Union’s aim […] to promote peace’12 that are often referring to its 
	
9 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Shared Vision, Common Action: A 
Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, 28, 
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10 A Arnull et al. (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011). 
11 Case C-294/83, The Greens (Les Verts) v. The Parliament ECLI:EU:C:1986:166. 
12 Art. 3(1) TEU. 
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relations with the wider world,13 there is no explicit reference to the role of the EU in 
intrastate conflicts that take place within its territory. This is hardly unexpected given the 
painful compromises that Treaty amendments have always entailed and how difficult it has 
been to reach those compromises in each and every intergovernmental conference. So, 
reaching a consensus on how the EU could deal with intrastate territorial disputes, would 
have always been a sisyphean task for the 27 Member States that have not even adopted a 
common position with regard to the recognition of Kosovo. 
This is not to suggest that the EU should not or would not admit independent States that have 
been created out of consensual and democratic secession as members, as some authors have 
suggested.14 The Union has already accommodated within its legal order the results of 
secessions that have taken place through consensual processes. This is evident from the fact 
that a number of Member States such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia have become 
independent through such processes and this was not considered to be a hurdle to their 
accession.  
Even on the heated debate of the continuing membership of a region that has consensually 
seceded from a Member State as it was rehearsed mainly before the 2014 Scottish 
referendum the main question had to do not with whether Scotland could become an EU 
Member State but rather what was the appropriate process. Still, it is important to highlight 
the constructive ambiguity about the right of continuous EU membership of a seceding region 
of a Member State. Such ambiguity points to the fact that the Member States and the 
institutions do not share –at a minimum-- a common view on the issue making it difficult for 
the EU to become more active in such situation.  
In the 2014 debate about Scotland’s right to remain in the EU, the interested parties 
interpreted the Treaties in opposing ways. On the one hand, the official position of the 
Commission at the moment was that 
If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that State because it were to 
become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory. In other 
words, a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country 
with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory.15 
	
13 Arts. 3(5), 8(1), 21(2)(c) TEU. 
14 JHH Weiler, ‘Slouching towards the Cool War; Catalonian Independence and the European Union; Roll of 
Honour; In this Issue; A Personal Statement’, (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law, 909. 
15 President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, Letter of 10 December 2012 to the House of 
Lords Economic Affairs Committee regarding the status of EU membership for Scotland in the event of 
independence, available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/economic-
affairs/ScottishIndependence/EA68_Scotland_and_the_EU_Barroso's_reply_to_Lord_Tugendhat_101212.pdf. 
In fact, this letter follows almost verbatim a similar position expressed by a previous President of the 
Commission, Romano Prodi, in 2004. According to it, ‘[w]hen a part of the territory of a Member State ceases 
to be a part of that state, e.g. because the territory becomes an independent state, the treaties will no longer 
apply to that territory. In other words, a newly independent region would, by the fact of its independence, 
become a third country with respect to the Union and the Treaties would from the day of its independence, 
not apply anymore […]’ If the new country wished them again to apply there would need to be ‘a negotiation 
on an agreement between the Applicant State and the Member States on the conditions of admission and the 
adjustments to the treaties which such admission entails. This agreement is subject to ratification by all 
Member States and the Applicant State.’, President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, Answer to 
Written Question P-0524/04, OJ 2004 C 84E, 421. 
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Thus, Scotland would have had to follow the procedure under Article 49 TEU in order to 
become an EU Member State.  
However, the Scottish government held a different view. They based their argument16 on the 
fact that the Scottish situation was sui generis. It would have been the first time that a region 
would secede from an EU Member State by a consensual and lawful constitutional process. It 
did so in order to distinguish itself from other secessionist claims in Europe and to ease the 
concerns of the respective metropolitan States. According to the Scottish position, Article 49 
only regulates “conventional enlargement where the candidate country is seeking 
membership from outside the EU.”17 But Scotland had been part of the EU since 1973. 
Therefore, the appropriate legal basis that would have facilitated Scotland’s transition to 
Union membership would have been Article 48 TEU, the generic provision on the amendment 
of the EU Treaties. In other words, the Scottish position was that the amendment of Article 
52 TEU, which provides for the States to which the Treaties apply and the relevant articles 
concerning the composition of the EU institutions would have been, by and large, sufficient 
in order for Scotland to become an EU Member State after its independence. 
The ambiguity as to how EU law applies in such situation18 points to the lack of consensus 
between the Member States. Such difference of views was underlined during the long hours 
of the morning of 19 September 2014 when the then Spanish Secretary of State for the 
European Union, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo made clear that if Scotland had become independent, 
it would have had to join the queue of the other candidate States, highlighting how time-
consuming this might be. More importantly, his statement shed doubt on whether Spain 
would ever accept Scotland as a Member State, fearing that this would create a dangerous 
precedent especially for the secessionist movements that exist in Spain.19 Again, this shows 
that the Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’ have never intended to allow the Union 
to have a more active role in ‘catalysing’ settlements of their intrastate territorial sovereignty 
conflicts. Occasionally, they even use the legal and political levers provided by the Treaties to 
frustrate processes that they consider as a threat to their own territorial integrity. 
 
B. The Legal Basis Problem 
Article 5 TEU clarifies that the Union is an organisation of conferred powers. The Union can 
only act on competences that the Member States have conferred on it. A closer look to its 
present institutional and legal framework clearly shows that although the Union can become 
a mediator in any conflict that takes place beyond its borders, it cannot assume such a role 
for intrastate conflicts that are within its territory. This lack of competence shows how much 
more difficult it is for the EU to ‘catalyse’ the settlement of a territorial sovereignty dispute 
inside its borders than outside. It also points to the fact that there is a clear ‘break point’ in 
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(2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 287. 




the linearity of enhanced conflict resolution potential on the part of the EU at the moment of 
the accession of any given State. 
 
1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union has to contribute inter alia to peace and 
security.20 That is why the adoption of a legislative act that could allow the EU to engage in 
principal mediation in negotiations for the settlement of any territorial sovereignty conflict 
could be prima facie legally based on the provisions for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. The Union could assume such a role in order to “safeguard its values, fundamental 
interests, security, independence and integrity; consolidate and support democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and the principles of international law; preserve peace, prevent conflicts 
and strengthen international security.”21 
In order to achieve this CFSP scope, the Union could adopt a decision defining the relevant 
actions to be undertaken.22 The device of the CFSP decisions has been introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty and, in essence, it replaces what was known in the pre-Lisbon era as joint 
actions.23 The joint actions were addressing specific situations where operational action by 
the EU was deemed necessary.24 They have concerned inter alia activities such as support for 
peace and stabilisation processes through the convening of an inaugural conference,25 
general support of a specific peace process,26 a contribution to a conflict settlement process,27 
and the appointment of a Special Representative.28 Thus, both the current provisions of the 
Treaties and the Union practice in the past suggest that the role of the negotiator between 
the parties in a dispute could be attributed to the EU by a decision defining an action. 
The adoption of such a decision for a territorial sovereignty conflict within the borders of a 
Member State, however, may be problematic from a legal point of view. If the Treaty on 
European Union is interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its 
terms, following the well established rule of Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of 
the Treaties,29 it would be difficult to justify the use of a CFSP device for an area that is part 
of the Union and for mediation between parties, whose members are Union citizens. In that 
sense, the adoption of a CFSP decision by the Council, in order to authorise the Union to play 
the role of the honest broker in an intrastate conflict that takes place within its borders, can 




20 Art. 3(5) TEU. 
21 Art. 21(2) TEU. 
22 Art. 25 TEU. 
23 Ex Art. 12 TEU. 
24 Ex Art. 14 (1) TEU. 
25 Joint Action 93/728 on the inaugural conference on the stability pact [1993] OJ L339/1. 
26 Joint Action 94/276 in support of the Middle East process [1994] OJ L119/1. 
27 Joint Action 2001/759 regarding a contribution from the European Union to the conflict settlement process 
in South Osetia [2001] OJ L286/4. 
28 Joint Action 2002/211 on the appointment of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
[2002] OJ L70/7. 
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 13 May 1969, UNTS 1155, 331. 
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2. Other Union Competences 
Unsurprisingly, conflict resolution does not appear in Title I of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU, which deals with categories and areas of Union competence. Thus, one could rightly 
argue that prima facie the TFEU cannot provide for any legal basis in order for the Union to 
authorise itself to actively engage in negotiations for the resolution of a territorial sovereignty 
conflict. 
However, the EU does possess a residual power in accordance with Article 352 (1) TFEU: 
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the 
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided 
the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. 
To the extent that assuming the role of the mediator in a territorial sovereignty dispute can 
be deemed as necessary for the achievement of one of the Treaty objectives, one could argue 
that Article 352 TFEU could provide for the legal basis. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty has clarified that the aforementioned Article cannot serve as “a 
basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and security policy.”30 This 
follows the well-established case law of the Court of Justice which has held that “recourse to 
that provision demands that the action envisaged should,” on the one hand, relate to the 
“operation of the common market” and, on the other, be intended to attain “one of the 
objectives of the Community.”31 “That latter concept, having regard to its clear and precise 
wording, cannot on any view be regarded as including the objectives of the CFSP.”32 As already 
mentioned, the role of the ‘broker’ in dispute resolution is considered as rather serving CFSP 
objectives. 
For the sake of argument, however, let us imagine that the Council unanimously approves a 
Commission proposal under Article 352 TFEU. Such legislative act would authorise the Union 
to become the principal actor in the negotiations for a settlement of a territorially sovereignty 
dispute. Even in this case, the 2/94 Opinion33 of the Court of Justice questions the legality of 
such a decision. On that occasion, the Council had requested the Opinion of the ECJ, both as 
regards the competence, under the then EC Treaty, for the Community to accede to the 
European Convention of Human Rights and the compatibility of such an accession with 
substantive provisions and principles of EC law. According to the Court, ex Article 308 TEC 
(now Article 352 TFEU) could not serve as a basis for widening the scope of EC powers beyond 
the general framework created by the Treaty provisions, as a whole, and by those that defined 
the tasks and the activities of the then EC.34 Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 TEC) cannot be 
used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect, in substance, would be to amend 
the Treaty without following the procedure provided for that purpose.35 If that proposition 
	
30 Art. 352(4) TFEU. 
31 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council of the European Union, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, para. 200. 
32 Ibid., para 201. 
33 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. For a comprehensive analysis of that judgment and the use of ex 
Art. 308 TEC see generally R Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of 
European Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 133-143. 
34 Opinion 2/94, ibid, paras. 27-30. 
35 Ibid. 
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applied to this case, it would mean that by attributing the role of the principal mediator to 
the Union following the adoption of a legislative act under Article 352 TFEU, the scope of the 
Union competences contained in the TFEU would most probably be widened beyond the 
general framework created by the provisions of this Treaty. Therefore Article 352 TFEU should 
not be used as a legal basis to that effect. 
On the other hand, one has to note that accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights would have been, in substance, a Treaty amendment without following the procedure 
provided for by the Treaty. Thus, it is rather difficult to draw conclusions from this Opinion 
for the purposes of this paper given that the constitutional significance of extending the scope 
of Union competences under the TFEU to include dispute resolution would have been much 
more trivial than the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
In any case, the fact that there is –at a minimum—an ambivalence about the existence of a 
legal basis that could allow the EU to assume a more active role to the resolution of territorial 
sovereignty disputes has political repercussions. It is more than probable that, should the 
Union ever try to assume such a role without the consent of all parties in the conflict, those 
constraints will be used against the procedure. It is not uncommon for the parties in a conflict 
to use every forum as another arena for their political battle, a platform for seeking 
international and local endorsement of their political arguments. 
 
C. The Duty of Loyal Cooperation 
So far, we have noted the inherent limitations of the Union constitutional structure that 
constrain the EU from becoming more active in intrastate conflicts within its borders. Still, 
Member States as Masters of the Treaties could always amend the text in order to create the 
necessary space for the EU to actively engage with the resolution of territorial sovereignty 
disputes. Even if such damascene conversion takes place and Member States allow the EU to 
intervene in what they so far consider to be strictly internal matters, there is a question 
concerning the political prudence of such development. 
The EU system of governance includes a number of channels for Member States to participate 
in and effectively influence the decision-making process. Heads of States and/or 
Governments take part in the European Council36 and ministers of the national governments 
predominantly consist of the Council of the EU.37 There are less opportunities and forums for 
legislative regions to have a say on how EU decisions are reached.38 This creates an 
asymmetry. It is much easier for Member States to influence the EU positions --including the 
EU with regard to the resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes-- than it is for 
constitutional regions.  
Such asymmetry is intensified by the very existence of the duty of loyal cooperation between 
the EU and the Member States enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU [ex Article 10 TEC]. Cremona 
argues that ‘the duty of cooperation is a constitutional principle developed in the context of 
mixed agreements but of broader application and deriving from the requirement of unity in 
	
36 Art. 15 TEU 
37 Art. 16 TEU. 
38 See N Skoutaris ‘The Role of Sub-State Entities in the EU Decision-Making Processes: A Comparative 
Constitutional Law Approach in E Cloots, G De Baere and S Sottiaux (eds), Federalism in the EU (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2012) 210. 
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the international representation of the [Union]’.39 Such a duty is of general application and 
does not depend either on whether the Union competence concerned is exclusive or on any 
right of the Member States to enter into obligations towards non-member countries.40 The 
Court held, in its judgment in Ireland v Commission,41 that ‘the duty to cooperate in good faith 
governs relations between the Member States and the institutions’42 and has emphasised 
that this obligation ‘imposes on Member States and the [Union] institutions mutual duties to 
cooperate in good faith’.43 As expressed more directly in the Treaty of Lisbon, ‘the Union shall 
respect [the Member States’] national identities inherent in their fundamental structures… it 
shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
State’.44 So, to the extent that a more active role of the EU in the resolution of a territorial 
sovereignty dispute would be seen as questioning the territorial integrity of a Member State, 
the duty of loyal cooperation might be breached. That makes the role of the EU as a neutral 
arbiter very difficult and the possibility that the EU would be seen as promoting the interests 
of the respective metropolitan State very real. This is why one has to question the political 
prudence of requesting the EU assuming the role of the neutral arbiter with regard to such 
disputes. 
 
IV. In lieu of a conclusion: Two thoughts on the Code of Good Practice and a more 
constructive role for the EU 
Overall, it has been shown that there are important legal constraints in the present Union 
institutional framework that would make the assumption of a more active role on the part of 
the EU with regard to territorial sovereignty disputes that take place within the borders of its 
Member States somehow problematic. The Union does not seem to have a competence to 
act as mediator between parties in such intrastate conflicts while the political prudence of 
such move is at least questionable. Still, it is possible for the EU to assume a more constructive 
role through informal channels of negotiation and the socialisation that the EU membership 
entails. The Code of Good Practice could greatly contribute with regard to both fronts. 
 
A. An Informal Way Out of the Legal Conundrum: The EU Role in the Croatia-Slovenia Border 
Dispute 
The leading role that the European Commission played in bridging the differences of Croatia 
and Slovenia over a border dispute might suggest that the political reality is more nuanced 
than presented before. In that particular case, the then Commissioner for Enlargement Olli 
Rehn “took the unusual role of mediating between a Member State and a candidate country.” 
	
39 M Cremona, ‘Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance’ in M Cremona 
and B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) 
125. See also Opinion 2/91 (re ILO Convention No 170) [1993] ECR I-1061, paras 36–38; Opinion 1/94 (re WTO 
Agreements) [1994] ECR I-5267, para 108. 
40 Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2005:341, para 58. 
41 Case C-339/00 Ireland v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:545. 
42 Ibid, para 71. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Art 4(2) TEU. 
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Indeed the agreement that was signed in November 2009 unblocked the accession 
negotiations between Croatia and the 27 Member States.45 
By analogy, this could mean that if the parties to a territorially sovereignty dispute ask the 
Union to act as mediator in a conflict situation – as Slovenia and Croatia have done – it would 
be rather difficult for the EU to reject such a request. In that sense, the EU could use a rather 
informal setting as it has done in the aforementioned case in order to act as a mediator and 
to ‘catalyse’ a settlement in an intrastate conflict. In any case, a limited reading of the role 
that the Union could play in the quest for the settlement of a conflict may disregard the fact 
that the scope of the CFSP over the years has been defined widely and the role of the 
European Council has been construed broadly. 
Within such an informal setting the Code of Good Practice in Resolving Territorial Sovereignty 
Conflicts could play a catalytic role as a soft law instrument. It could offer much-needed 
guidance as to how the EU could positively engage with and contribute to the resolution of 
those disputes. It could also act as a yardstick that spells out the appropriate constitutional 
behaviour of all the conflicting parties during such crisis. 
Having said that, the recent CJEU judgment Slovenia v Croatia points also to the limits of such 
informal approach.46 Croatia informed Slovenia of its decision to terminate the arbitration 
agreement brokered under the auspices of the EU on the ground that one of the arbitrators 
was secretly communicating with the Slovenian agent. The arbitral tribunal acknowledged the 
breach but did not accept that its gravity justified the termination of the agreement. In June 
2017, the tribunal rendered a final arbitration award whose validity has been fiercely denied 
by Croatia.  
This cautionary tale serves as a reminder that parties to such disputes would always try to 
strengthen their political positions using all available legal arenas. This makes the adoption of 
the code as a soft law instrument all the more important securing that the EU would follow 
the appropriate standards of conduct when engaging in the resolution of such conflicts. To 
the extent that the resolution of a territorial sovereignty dispute follows a democratic and 
consensual approach, one could even argue that the use of such code could contribute to the 
effective protection of Article 4(2) TEU. There, the Union proclaims its obligation to respect 
the national identities of the Member States inherent in their fundamental political and 
constitutional structures. A resolution process guided by the principles underpinning the code 
could be regarded as respecting the rights and obligations enshrined in the constitutional 
orders of both the relevant Member State and the EU and in particular the founding values of 
the Union as provided in Article 2 TEU. 
 
B. Socialisation 
The Union has failed to ‘catalyse’ a comprehensive settlement in a number of territorial 
sovereignty disputes within its borders. This does not mean that Union membership should 
be understood as a trivial change of context that cannot alter the dynamics of a given conflict 
and contribute to its resolution. Guelke suggested as early as in 1989 that the place of 
Northern Ireland in the EU, European standards on democracy, human rights, and the 
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treatment of minorities would be just as important as the interlocking internal, North-South, 
and East-West dimensions of a solution inspired by local and British-Irish ideas.47 Some years 
later, Meehan argued that the broader European background and new perceptions of 
sovereignty that EU membership has facilitated, influenced the designing of Good Friday 
Agreement.48 
To be sure, the EU has had no impact on sectarian factionalism within Northern Ireland. However, 
it has provided a framework for improved practical relations between the UK and Irish 
governments. In this way, the sharing of sovereignty within the EU has spilled over into some 
sharing of sovereignty over Northern Ireland.49 
EU’s indirect but significant contribution to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland points to the fact the Union could potentially offer some inspiration with regard to 
issues of shared sovereignty, consociational policy mechanisms and democratic resolution in 
all territorial sovereignty disputes. At the end of the day, the Union’s comparative advantage 
is in its long-term efforts to change the environments out of which conflicts spring, so as to 
inoculate against them.50  
This is precisely where the Code of Practice could help the EU spell out all those principles 
and mechanisms that should be used in resolving those disputes. By adopting such Code as a 
soft law instrument, the EU would make clear that the consensual and democratic resolution 
is the appropriate way for the resolution of territorial sovereignty conflicts without appearing 
as overly intrusive in the “internal affairs” of its Member States. The message that such 
adoption would send is that the political and constitutional ethos of the EU necessitates that 
those disputes should be resolved accordingly hoping that the Member States would start 
slowly but surely reconsidering their views. If this strategy is verified, it would be another case 
that would prove that the Union is mainly a mechanism that promotes, to use Popper’s terms, 
‘piecemeal social engineering’ rather than ‘Utopian’.51 At the end of the day, Europe itself was 
not made all at once, or according to a single plan. It was built through concrete achievements 
which first created a de facto solidarity.52  
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